












WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 




Yannis Georgellis  
and  














FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
411 Locust Street 
St. Louis, MO 63102 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 
cleared with the author or authors. 
Photo courtesy of The Gateway Arch, St. Louis, MO.   www.gatewayarch.com1
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT
YANNIS GEORGELLIS and HOWARD J. WALL
∗
December 2002, revised March 2004
This paper uses a spatial panel approach to examine the effect of the government-policy
environment on the level of entrepreneurship.  Specifically, we investigate whether marginal
income tax rates and bankruptcy exemptions influence rates of entrepreneurship.  Whereas
previous work in the literature finds that both policies are positively related to entrepreneurship,
we find non-monotonic relationships: a U-shaped relationship between marginal tax rates and
entrepreneurship and an S-shaped relationship between bankruptcy exemptions and
entrepreneurship. (JEL J23, R12)
I. INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship is thought to be an important factor in spawning innovation,
employment, and economic growth.  Because the benefits flowing from entrepreneurship are not
necessarily captured by the entrepreneurs themselves, but can be realized more generally, the
case is often made that the level of entrepreneurship is below its social optimum and deserves
some attention from policymakers.  Despite the recognized importance of entrepreneurship,
however, there has been relatively little empirical analysis of the role played by the government-
policy environment.
Previous research on self-employment and entrepreneurship has examined the roles of
various demographic, human capital, and financial considerations in the decision to become an
entrepreneur.  Typically, studies have indicated the importance of (i) the earnings differential
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between entrepreneurship and paid employment (Rees and Shah, 1986; Gill, 1988; Hamilton,
2000); (ii) liquidity constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989, Holtz-
Eakin et al., 1994 and 1994b; Black and Strahan, 2002); (iii) satisfaction differentials (Taylor,
1996; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Blanchflower, 2000); (iv) macroeconomic conditions
(Taylor, 1996; Parker, 1996; Cowling and Mitchell, 1997); and (v) intergenerational human
capital transfers (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Hout and Rosen, 2000).
1
Empirical studies that have considered the effects of the policy environment on
entrepreneurship have focused on personal income tax rates, with the expectation that higher tax
rates should suppress entrepreneurship.  Nearly all studies, however, have found a positive
relationship, whether it is between tax rates and aggregate rates of entrepreneurship (Long,
1982a; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Blau, 1987; Parker, 1996; Robson, 1998; and Bruce and
Mohsin, 2003) or between tax rates and the individual-level probability of entrepreneurship
(Long, 1982b; Scheutze, 2000; Fan and White, 2003).  This divergence between expectations
and results is usually attributed to the perception that, because of the nature of a tax system that
relies on self-reporting, being an entrepreneur allows for relatively greater opportunities for tax
avoidance.
2  Cullen and Gordon (2002), however, argue that, because entrepreneurs have the
option of whether or not to incorporate their business, and because personal income tax rates are
higher than corporate ones, the tax system provides a net subsidy to risk-taking.  This is because
an entrepreneur facing losses would prefer to face personal income tax rates so that the deduction
of the losses against other income would have greater tax-reducing value.  All else equal, an
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increase in personal income tax rates make this option more valuable, thereby increasing the
likelihood that someone would choose to become an entrepreneur.
Other studies have begun to look at the question of taxes and entrepreneurship using
more-complicated indicators of the tax system.  Robson and Wren (1999) separate the effects of
average and marginal tax rates, suggesting that the former represents the incentive for tax
avoidance while the latter represents the disincentive effect.
3  Bruce (2000) looks at the
differential tax treatment of self-employment and wage-and-salary earnings, finding that
marginal and average tax rates on self-employment earnings are negatively related to the
probability of becoming self-employed.  Gentry and Hubbard (2000) find that the more
progressive a tax system is, the less likely it is that an individual will enter self-employment.
Bruce, Deskins, and Mohsin (2003) look at state-level differences in a variety of tax policies,
including rates of sales taxes and personal and corporate income taxes, along with whether states
allow combined reporting and limited liability corporations.
A recently opened line of inquiry into the effects of the policy environment on
entrepreneurship has raised the question of whether or not bankruptcy laws affect the number of
entrepreneurs (Berkowitz and White, 2004; Fan and White, 2003; White, 2001).  Briefly, U.S.
bankruptcy laws allow individuals filing for personal bankruptcy to exempt some of their assets
and income from distribution to their creditors.  The exemptions, which differ a great deal across
states, can include some or all of the value of a person’s home (the homestead exemption),
pension holdings, and an assortment of other assets.
4
                                                
3.  Their theoretical model separates the tax effects into pure marginal and pure average tax changes, roughly
analogous to substitution and income effects.  Unfortunately, the tax rates they use in their empirical analysis are
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4.  For detailed discussions of U.S. personal bankruptcy laws and the incentives they create, see White (1998),
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The direct effect of these exemptions is to provide a sort of wealth insurance in the event
that an entrepreneurial venture fails.  Thus, by this wealth-insurance effect, higher exemption
levels should lead to more entrepreneurs.  Less direct than the wealth-insurance effect is a credit-
access effect, which works in the opposite direction.  It arises because banks and other credit
providers adjust their actions in response to changes in bankruptcy exemptions.  As a result, the
higher the exemption level, the less credit will be available at a given interest rate.
5  These two
opposing effects of bankruptcy exemptions on entrepreneurship mean that the sign of the total
effect is ambiguous in general.  However, Fan and White (2003) find that the wealth-insurance
effect dominates the credit-access effect for all levels of the exemption.  In fact, they find that
homeowners in states with an unlimited homestead exemption are 35 percent more likely to be
self-employed than equivalent homeowners in states with low exemption levels.
In an attempt to resolve the results on the effects of taxes and to enhance the modeling of
bankruptcy exemptions, this paper takes a different approach to estimating the effects of
government policies on entrepreneurship.  Specifically, following Georgellis and Wall (2000a),
we create a state-level panel dataset that pools observations over space and time.
6  This allows us
to look at the effects of changes in policies over time while exploiting the large differences
across states in levels of entrepreneurship, bankruptcy exemptions, and tax rates.  The
advantages of this approach over aggregate time-series studies ― which have only one
observation per time period ― are that we can include a large number of control variables, use
more-general specifications of policy variables, and control for trends more effectively.  Another
advantage, which we outline in greater detail below, is that it allows us to create a continuous
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variable for the homestead exemption, rather than having to group different exemption levels
together into dummy variables, as is necessary when using individual-level panels.
Using the spatial-panel approach, we find a U-shaped relationship between marginal tax
rates and entrepreneurship.  At low tax rates the relationship is negative, and at high rates it is
positive.  Also, we find an S-shaped relationship between the homestead exemption and
entrepreneurship.  Specifically, an increase in the homestead exemption from very low or very
high levels acts to reduce the number of entrepreneurs, while an increase in the middle range acts
to increase the number of entrepreneurs.
II. SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL TRENDS IN U.S. ENTREPRENEURSHIP
We define the rate of entrepreneurship as the proportion of the working-age population
that is classified as nonfarm proprietors.  In common with most of the literature, we exclude farm
proprietors on the grounds that the decision to become a farm proprietor depends on different
factors than the decision to become a nonfarm proprietor, and because farmers operate under
different bankruptcy laws than do other proprietors.
Proprietors’ employment is the number of people who are employed in their own
business, regardless of whether that business is incorporated.  Various other measures of
entrepreneurship have been used in the literature, such as the non-farm self-employed, which
excludes farmers and the incorporated.
7  The rate of entrepreneurship is usually calculated with
the labor force or total employment in the denominator.  We prefer to use the working-age
population because, unlike the size of the labor force or the number employed, it is not likely to
move with the number of entrepreneurs as people move between employment states.  This
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distinction also recognizes the fact that entrepreneurs are drawn from the entire working-age
population, not just those currently employed or in the labor force.
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the cross-state differences in the levels and growth of
entrepreneurship during our sample period, 1991-98.  In general, states in the western half of the
country had the highest levels of entrepreneurship.  The eastern part of the country contained all
of the regions with the lowest rates of entrepreneurship: the Great Lakes, the Upper South, and
the Deep South.  In the East, only New England states were in the top two quartiles of
entrepreneurship.  As Figure 1b shows, all states saw increases in their rates of entrepreneurship
between 1991 and 1998, and there was some convergence.  Southern states, New York, and the
lagging western states had the highest growth in entrepreneurship, while much of the West saw
relatively little growth.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
Assume that each person has the option of being an employee of someone else, becoming
an entrepreneur, or not working.  The utility outcomes of these options are uncertain and depend
on prevailing market conditions and the person’s abilities and preferences in each of the
activities.  Define the mean person as that member of a state or national population who
possesses the mix of characteristics and skills expected of a randomly selected person.  Denote
the utility that the country’s mean person would attain as: an entrepreneur in state i as 
e
i U , an
employee as 
m
i U , and not working as  n
i U .  For the country’s mean person, the utility levels in
these activities differ across states because of differences in industrial mix, business conditions,
government policies, and amenities.7
For state i’s mean person, the difference in utility between entrepreneurship and




i U U δ + −  where δi differentiates the mean person in the state from the mean
person in the country as a whole.  δi differs across states because of spatial differences in
education levels, age, entrepreneurial human capital, and other individual characteristics, some
of which are unobservable or unmeasurable.  Similarly, for state i’s mean person, the difference




i U U λ + −  where  i λ  differentiates
the mean person in the state from the mean person in the country as a whole.
   Define a random variable eij such that  1 = ij e  if person j in state i is an entrepreneur and
0 = ij e  otherwise.  If person j were selected randomly from state i, the probability that he would
be an entrepreneur is the probability that entrepreneurship provides a higher level of utility to
state i’s mean person than do the alternatives:
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Summing (1) across the Ni people in i and dividing by the population, Ni,
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where  0   and   2 1 > F F .  Assuming a large enough population, Ei is the rate of entrepreneurship in
state i.
According to equation (2), a state’s rate of entrepreneurship increases along with the
relative utility that entrepreneurship provides for the state’s mean person.  This differs across
states because (i) state labor forces differ in their relative skills and preferences for
entrepreneurship (i.e., δi and  i λ  differ across states) and (ii), controlling for individual8
characteristics, the relative suitability for entrepreneurship differs across states (i.e.,  m
i
e




i U U − differ by state).
Using t to denote the time period, assume that (2) can be estimated with the following
regression equation:
(3)         . it t i it E ε + ′ + + + τ + α = it it it G γ Z θ' X β'
In equation (3),  i α  is a state-specific component that is constant over time and  t τ  is a year-
specific component that is common to all states.  The vectors Zit and Xit measure, respectively,
business conditions and average demographic characteristics in state i in year t.  Government
policy variables are included in the vector Git, and  it ε  is the error term.
IV. DATA
The demographic variables included in Xit capture the spatial and temporal differences in
age, gender, and racial compositions of state populations.  As outlined in Georgellis and Wall
(2000b), rates of self-employment differ a great deal across these categories.  We therefore
include age variables that measure differences in population shares of broad age categories.
Also, because men are nearly twice as likely as women to be self-employed, we include the
female share of a state’s population.  Finally, Xit includes the black, Native American, Asian and
Pacific Islander, and Hispanic population shares.  Large variations in self-employment across
these groups might explain state-level differences in entrepreneurship.  For example, the self-
employment rate for blacks is only about one-third of that for whites and Asians.
Here and in the previous section we discuss these variables in terms of the supply of
potential entrepreneurs.  However, one should be careful about the interpretation of the estimated9
coefficients because these demographic groups might also differ in their demand for the products
that are more likely to be produced by entrepreneurs.  For example, as Georgellis and Wall
(2000b) report, over 10 percent of self-employed women in 1997 were in the child-care business,
while virtually no men were.  This indicates that a state with a higher-than-average female
population share might have a higher-than-average supply of child-care providers.  On the other
hand, such a state also has a higher-than-average number of women demanding child-care
services.
The vector of business conditions, Zit, includes measures of a state’s economy that affect
the profitability of entrepreneurship.  These include the state’s unemployment rate, per capita
real income, per capita real wealth (as proxied by dividends, interest, and rent), relative
proprietor’s wage, and industry employment shares.  As with our demographic variables, the
interpretation of the roles of these variables is not entirely clear because each can simultaneously
indicate the demand for entrepreneurs’ services and the supply of entrepreneurs.  For example,
while we include the unemployment rate as a measure of the health of a state’s economy, Parker
(1996), among others, includes it as an indicator of the number of people with limited
opportunities for wage-and-salary employment who might be pushed into self-employment.
As Georgellis and Wall (2000a) demonstrate, the specification of our control variables ―
the elements of Xit and Zit ― is potentially important.  They show, for example, that the
relationship between the rates of self-employment and unemployment in Britain is hill-shaped.
Indeed, the best fit in the present context would allow for nonlinear relationships.  Nonetheless,
our present purpose is to estimate the effects of taxes and the homestead exemption, and a simple
linear specification for the control variables makes little difference in this regard.  Therefore, for
parsimony, we use a linear specification for these control variables.10
Presently, the variables of most interest are those measuring marginal tax rates and the
homestead exemption.  For the former, we use the maximum marginal tax rates (state plus
federal) as generated by the NBER’s TAXSIM model (see Table 1 for the state maximum
marginal tax rates in 1990 and 1997, the first and last years of data used in our study).  Of the tax
rate measures used in the literature, this one best fits our needs.  For one, it is the measure used
in the paper most comparable to ours, Fan and White (2003).  But, more importantly, it is
exogenous, unlike the average marginal tax rate also generated by TAXSIM.  While very few
people will actually face the maximum marginal tax rate, there should be a very strong
correlation between the marginal tax rates that the average person faces and the maximum rate.
We constructed our homestead exemption variable to take into account several state-level
differences in bankruptcy law.  First, as noted above and as summarized by Table 1, there are
large differences in the exemption level across states: In 1997, five states did not allow any
homestead exemption, while seven had an unlimited exemption.  Also, some states allow for the
federal exemption to be substituted at the filer’s discretion, and some states allow married filers
to double the exemption level.  Because our variable is meant to capture the exemption that the
average person in a state might face, we also take into account differences in the average house
prices and the likelihood that a filer owns rather than rents.
Our homestead exemption variable starts by taking the state exemption level or, if the
state allows the federal option, the maximum of the state and federal exemption levels.  If this is
greater than the average house price in the state, we use the average house price instead, which is
a more accurate representation of the exemption that the average person would get.  We then
multiplied this by the state’s homeownership rate and, if the state allows married householders to
double the exemption, we also multiply it by one plus the state’s share of households in which11
both spouses reside together.  The result of this divided by the average house price yields our
homestead exemption rate.
Note that the sources for all of the data used to construct our variables are given in the
data appendix, as are the summary statistics for all of the independent variables described above.
We should also note that our two most important dependent variables — the homestead
exemption rate and the maximum marginal tax rate — are statistically independent, as indicated
by their correlation coefficient of -0.01.
As we mention above, one of the main benefits of our spatial panel approach is that the
relative abundance of observations means that we can easily allow for non-linearities.  This is
important because, for each of our government policy variables, there are opposing effects,
meaning that the relationships might be non-monotonic.  This is easiest to see with tax rates, for
which the standard negative labor-effort effect is countered by the positive tax-avoidance effect.
Assuming a non-trivial cost to being caught avoiding taxes, at low tax rates the incentive to
avoid taxes will not be terribly strong because the net expected benefits are not very high.
Conversely, under very high tax rates, the benefit of avoiding taxes is much higher.
Our choice of functional form for the tax and homestead exemption variables is crucial to
our results.  Theory gives us no guidance on the appropriate specification; so, to be as general as
reasonably possible, we began with a cubic form for both variables.  This specification fits the
homestead exemption rate well, yielding statistically significant coefficients for all three terms.
However, because the coefficients on all three terms for the tax variable were not statistically
different from zero, we re-estimated using a quadratic specification, which yielded two
statistically significant coefficients.  Thus, our baseline model, which we report and discuss in12
detail below, uses a quadratic tax variable and a cubic homestead exemption variable.  In the
section following our discussion of the baseline results, we discuss alternative specifications.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our dependent variable is the rate of entrepreneurship, as defined above, for 1991-1998,
and our independent variables are all lagged by one year.  To allow for the most general error
structure given our data constraints, we estimate (3) using feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS).  This allows for state-specific heteroskedastic errors, although, because of a relatively
short panel, we still need to assume that errors are uncorrelated across states.
8  We also allow for
each state’s errors to follow their own AR(1) process.
Table 2 summarizes our results.  As discussed above, we attach little importance to the
coefficients on our demographic and business conditions variables, but simply note that omitting
them would have a statistically significant effect on the results.  More importantly, our
estimation indicated that the marginal tax rate and the homestead exemption rate are both related
non-monotonically to the rate of entrepreneurship.
Our estimates of the effects of marginal tax rates on entrepreneurship indicate that at tax
rates at the low end of our observed rates ― 28 to 35 percent ― an increase in the tax rate will
reduce the number of entrepreneurs (see Figure 2).  Beyond this range, higher marginal taxes
will increase the number of entrepreneurs indirectly as, presumably, the tax-avoidance incentives
become large enough to begin outweighing the possible penalties.
The cubic relationship between the homestead exemption rate and entrepreneurship is
illustrated by Figure 3.  At very low and very high exemption rates ― between 0 and 20 percent
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and above 60 percent ― an increase in the homestead exemption leads to a decrease in the rate
of entrepreneurship, suggesting that the credit-access effect dominates.  At the mid-range of
exemption rates ― between 20 and 60 percent ― an increase in the homestead exemption rate
leads to an increase in the rate of entrepreneurship, suggesting that the wealth-insurance effect
dominates.  Note, though, that only rates between 50 and 72 percent lead to a higher rate of
entrepreneurship than there would be with no homestead exemption at all.
The year dummies are also interesting and suggest an underlying trend in
entrepreneurship not captured by demographics, business conditions, or government policies.
The estimated coefficient on the 1998 dummy indicates that state rates of entrepreneurship
would have risen, on average, by 1.2 percentage points from 1991 to 1998 if all of the variables
we include in our estimation remained at their initial levels.
Figure 4 plots the estimated fixed effects across the states, illustrating the extent to which
differences in entrepreneurship are determined by differences in the variables included in our
regression.  Most noticeably, comparing Figures 1a and 4, we see that not all states with low
levels of entrepreneurship also have low estimated fixed effects.  In particular, states in the Great
Lakes, Upper South, and Deep South regions have low levels of entrepreneurship, typically
falling in the lowest quartile.  However, the fixed effects for the Deep South states are not in the
lowest quartile, while those for the Great Lakes and Upper South states are.  This indicates that
the relatively low levels of entrepreneurship in the Deep South are due to relatively inhospitable
business conditions, demographic factors, or government policies.  On the other hand, the low
levels of entrepreneurship in the Great Lakes and Upper South are attributable to fixed factors,
which Georgellis and Wall (2000a) suggest might include cultural, historical, or sociological
factors that suppress entrepreneurship.  At the other extreme are states in New England and the14
West, which have high levels of entrepreneurship and high estimated fixed effects.  This suggests
that one of the reasons for the high levels of entrepreneurship are that these states contain the
cultural, historical, and sociological makeup to pursue and succeed in entrepreneurship.
VI. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES
Our baseline model uses specific functional forms for the policy variables and
generalized least-squares estimation to allow for state-specific autocorrelation and cross-
sectionally uncorrelated heteroskedasticity.  To check the consequence of these choices on our
estimation of the effects of our policy variables, we present the results of six alternatives.
9  These
alternative results, which either use a different specification of the policy variables or place
stronger restrictions on the error terms, are reported in Table 3 and illustrated by Figures 5 and 6.
Alternative I restricts the coefficients on the squared and cubed terms of the policy
variables to zero.  Estimation under these restrictions yields a positive and statistically significant
effect for the marginal tax rate on entrepreneurship and a negative but statistically insignificant
effect for the homestead exemption rate.  Alternative II restricts the coefficient on the cubed term
of the homestead exemption rate to zero while using the same quadratic functional form for the
marginal tax rate as in the baseline model.  The estimated relationship between the maximum
marginal tax rate and entrepreneurship under this restriction differs very little from the baseline
results.  On the other hand, as previously stated, the estimated coefficients on the homestead
exemption rate are both statistically no different from zero.  The results from these two
alternative specifications indicate that the choices we have made about the specification of the
policy variables are important for our conclusions.  Likelihood ratio tests reject the null
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hypotheses that the restrictions that these alternatives place on the higher-order terms do not have
a statistically significant effect on the estimation.  Therefore, the least-restrictive baseline model
is preferred statistically to the two alternatives.
Three other alternatives place stronger restrictions on the error terms than does the
baseline model: In alternative III they are assumed to be homoskedastic, in alternative IV they
are not autocorrelated, and in alternative V their autocorrelation is common across states.  As
Figure 5 illustrates, none of these restrictions has an effect on the estimated U shape for the
relationship between marginal tax rates and the rate of entrepreneurship, although the
coefficients in alternative III are not statistically significant.  The important differences are that
the estimated relationship is flatter with alternative III and steeper with alternatives IV and V.
For the relationship between the homestead exemption rate and the rate of
entrepreneurship, only the estimates from alternative III differ in any non-trivial way.  All three
alternatives yield an S-shaped relationship, although the estimated relationship is everywhere
steeper with alternative III than with the baseline model.  Another important difference is that
alternative III suggests that all homestead exemption rates above 42 percent will yield more
entrepreneurship than would a zero exemption, whereas the baseline model suggests that this is
true only for homestead exemption rates between 50 and 72 percent.
Alternative VI replaces the continuous homestead exemption variables with dummy
variables for discrete ranges of the homestead exemption rate.  Because this removes any general
assumption regarding functional form, it allows us to verify the general shape of the cubic
relationship of our baseline model.  We split the observed homestead exemption rates into
octiles, each with 50 observations, and estimate the model with the first octile omitted to avoid
perfect collinearity.  As summarized by Table 3, for all but one of the octiles of the homestead16
exemption rate, the rate of entrepreneurship is statistically different from what it would be under
the first octile.  Further, as illustrated by Figure 6, these results confirm the general S-shape to
the relationship between the homestead exemption rate and the rate of entrepreneurship.  Note
also that this specification has little effect on the estimated relationship between the rate of
entrepreneurship and the maximum marginal tax rate.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper uses the spatial panel approach of Georgellis and Wall (2000a) to estimate the
effects of personal income tax rates and bankruptcy exemptions on entrepreneurship.  Using data
for all 50 states of the United States for 1991-1998, we find non-homothetic relationships.
Specifically, at low initial tax levels, an increase in marginal tax rates reduces the number of
entrepreneurs, although at higher initial tax levels it will do the opposite.  We also find that at
very low and very high initial levels an increase in the homestead exemption will reduce the
number of entrepreneurs.  In the mid-range of homestead exemption rates there is a positive
relationship between the exemption level and entrepreneurship.  Further, only for relatively high
homestead exemption rates will the level of entrepreneurship be higher than if there were no
homestead exemption at all.17
TABLE 1
 State Homestead Exemptions and Maximum Marginal Tax Rates
Maximum Marginal Tax Rates Homestead Exemptions
State 1990 1997 1990 1997
Alabama 3.65 3.12 $5,000 $5,000
Alaska 0 0 54,000 54,000
Arizona 6.51 4.8 100,000 100,000
Arkansas 7 7 no limit no limit
California 9.3 9.78 7,500 15,000
Colorado 4.76 5.36 20,000 30,000
Connecticut 0 4.5 0 75,000
Delaware 7.7 6.9 0 0
Florida 0 0 no limit no limit
Georgia 5.66 5.83 5,000 5,000
Hawaii 9 9 30,000 30,000
Idaho 8.2 8.2 30,000 50,000
Illinois 3 3 7,500 7,500
Indiana 3.4 3.4 7,500 7,500
Iowa 7.39 6.36 no limit no limit
Kansas 5.15 6.45 no limit no limit
Kentucky 4.39 6 5,000 5,000
Louisiana 4.14 3.75 15,000 15,000
Maine 8.5 8.5 7,500 12,500
M a r y l a n d5600
Massachusetts 5.95 5.95 100,000 100,000
Michigan 4.6 4.4 3,500 3,500
Minnesota 8 8.86 no limit 200,000
Mississippi 4.75 4.85 30,000 75,000
Missouri 4.39 6 8,000 8,000
Montana 8.59 6.83 40,000 40,000
Nebraska 6.4 7 10,000 10,000
Nevada 0 0 90,000 125,000
New Hampshire 0 0 5,000 30,000
New Jersey 3.5 6.37 0 0
New Mexico 7.83 8.4 20,000 30,000
New York 7.88 6.85 10,000 10,000
North Carolina 7 8.08 7,500 10,000
North Dakota 3.77 5.25 80,000 80,000
Ohio 6.9 7.2 5,000 5,000
Oklahoma 6.72 6.05 no limit no limit
Oregon 8.12 9 15,000 25,000
Pennsylvania 2.1 2.8 0 0
Rhode Island 6.04 9.66 0 0
South Carolina 7 7.3 5,000 5,000
South Dakota 0 0 no limit no limit
Tennessee 0 0 5,000 5,000
Texas 0 0 no limit no limit
Utah 6.26 5.72 8,000 8,000
Vermont 6.54 8.85 30,000 30,000
Virginia 5.75 5.75 5,000 5,000
Washington 0 0 30,000 30,000
West Virginia 6.5 6.5 7,500 15,000
Wisconsin 6.93 6.93 40,000 40,000
Wyoming 0 0 10,000 10,000
Federal 7,500 15,00018
TABLE 2
Baseline FGLS Results.  Dependent variable: state rate of entrepreneurship = (non-farm
proprietors’ employment)/(working-age population)
Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic
Policies
Maximum marginal tax rate -0.092 0.056 -1.66
Maximum marginal tax rate squared 1.3 e
-3 0.7 e
-3 1.75
Homestead exemption rate -0.118 0.024 -4.93
Homestead exemption rate squared 0.004 0.001 4.77




Adult share aged 45-65 0.173 0.054 3.22
Adult share aged 65+ 0.034 0.078 0.44
Female share of population 0.080 0.020 4.06
Black share of population -0.146 0.086 -1.70
Native American share of population 0.175 0.407 0.43
Asian/Pac. Isl. share of population -0.111 0.180 -0.62
Hispanic share of population -0.067 0.066 -1.01
Business conditions
Unemployment rate 0.106 0.025 4.26
Real per capita income -1.1 e
-4 0.9 e
-4 -1.23
Real per capita wealth 0.310 0.229 1.35
Relative proprietor’s wage 0.342 0.399 0.86
Industry shares Yes                      ―                       ―
Year dummies
1992 -0.221 0.055 -4.01
1993 -0.106 0.090 -1.18
1994 0.207 0.119 1.73
1995 0.606 0.152 3.98
1996 1.038 0.183 5.67
1997 1.153 0.219 5.25
1998 1.224 0.255 4.81
State fixed effects Yes           ―            ―
Constant -22.442 119.659          -0.19
Log-likelihood -6.291
Number of observations 400
Estimated covariances 50
Estimated autocorrelations 50
Note: The estimation corrects for state-specific heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Omitted
reference variables are: adult share aged 18-44, white share of population, government share of
employment, and 1991.19
TABLE 3
 Alternative FGLS Results.  Dependent variable: state rate of entrepreneurship = (non-farm
proprietors’ employment)/(working-age population)
I II III IV V VI
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Second octile of homestead
exemption rate
––––– - 0 . 2 8 5 *
(0.087)
Third octile of homestead
exemption rate
––––– - 0 . 3 9 1 *
(0.095)
Fourth octile of homestead
exemption rate
––––– - 0 . 4 7 7 *
(0.199)
Fifth octile of homestead
exemption rate
–––––  - 0 . 4 4 5 *
(0.126)
Sixth octile of homestead
exemption rate
––––– 0 . 1 4 6
(0.165)
Seventh octile of homestead
exemption rate
–––––   0 . 3 8 2 *
(0.233)
Eighth octile of homestead
exemption rate
–––––   0 . 2 5 9 *
(0.232)
Demographics, bus. cond's,
year and state effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Autocorrelation State State State None Common State
Log-likelihood -7.56 -4.49 -114.92 -26.55 -26.46 0.514
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  “*” indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
Model I: baseline model with restriction that higher-order effects of policy variables are zero.
Model II: baseline model with restriction that third-order effect of homestead exemption is zero.
Model III: baseline model with assumption that errors are homoskedastic.
Model IV: baseline model with assumption that errors are not autocorrelated.
Model V: baseline model with assumption that autocorrelation is common across states.
Model VI: baseline model with home exemption rate octiles and state-specific heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.20
FIGURE 1a
Average Rates of Entrepreneurship, 1991-98
16.6 to 20.2  (11)
14.5 to 16.6  (13)
12.2 to 14.5  (12)
10.5 to 12.2  (14)
FIGURE 1b
 Percentage Change in Rates of Entrepreneurship, 1991-98
14.2 to 22.4  (12)
11.9 to 14.2  (11)
9.1 to 11.9  (13)
3.8 to 9.1  (14)21
FIGURE 2
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Estimated State Fixed Effects
-2.4 to 2.7  (11)
-4.1 to -2.4  (13)
-5.4 to -4.1  (12)
-9.5 to -5.4  (14)23
FIGURE 5
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Non-farm proprietors’ employment Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Table CA25
Unemployment rate Bureau of Labor Statistics
Dividends, interest, and rent Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Table CA05
Per capita gross state product Bureau of Economic Analysis
Average non-farm proprietors’
income; average wage and salary
disbursements
Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Table CA30
Industry employment shares Establishment Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Age, race, and sex population
shares
Bureau of the Census
Maximum marginal tax rates TAXSIM, National Bureau of Economic Research
Homestead bankruptcy exemptions Elias, Renaur, and Leonard, How to File for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy, various editions
Median house price Derived using median house price from 1990 Census and
the Home Price Index from the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight
Home ownership rate Bureau of the Census
Share of households with
householder and spouse
Bureau of the Census, derived from 1990 and 2000 Census
assuming constant state-level rates of change
TABLE 1A
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
Coefficient Standard Error
Maximum marginal tax rate -0.092 0.056
Homestead exemption rate -0.118 0.024
Adult share aged 45-65 0.173 0.054
Adult share aged 65+ 0.034 0.078
Female share of population 0.080 0.020
Black share of population -0.146 0.086
Native American share of population 0.175 0.407
Asian/Pac. Isl. share of population -0.111 0.180
Hispanic share of population -0.067 0.066
Unemployment rate 0.106 0.025
Real per capita income -1.1 e
-4 0.9 e
-4
Real per capita wealth 0.310 0.229
Relative proprietor’s wage 0.342 0.39926
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